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ABSTRACT
There is a belief that allowing communities monitoring power over provi-
ders could be beneficial for improving service delivery and reducing
corruption in service delivery. In community monitoring interventions
(CMIs), the community is given the opportunity to observe and assess
providers’ performance and provide feedback to providers and politicians.
This systematic review and meta-analysis appraises and synthesises evi-
dence on the effects of CMIs on access and quality of service delivery and
corruption outcomes in low and middle-income countries. The results
indicate evidence of beneficial effects of CMIs on service delivery quality
and on helping to curb corruption. The potential benefits of CMIs on
access to and quality of services are likely to be higher when interventions
are designed so that contact between both actors are promoted, and tools
for citizens to monitor agents’ performance are provided. However, more
rigorous research is needed to address this hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
Corruption and inefficient allocation of resources in service delivery are widespread in low and
middle-income countries (Pande and Olken 2011). There is increasing evidence that corruption
holds back countries’ economic development and erodes their citizens’ quality of life (Mauro 1995;
Svensson 2005; Singer 2013). Millions of people around the world encounter administrative
corruption in their daily interactions with public services (Transparency International 2013). The
World Bank Institute estimates that total bribes in a year amount to about 1 trillion USD (Rose-
Ackerman 2004), making corruption account for around 3 per cent of world GDP (Svensson 2005).
Bribes are used to influence the actions of public officials, either to performed their duties, distort
the duties or to prevent them from performing their duties.
In many countries, corruption is widespread throughout the public sector, not only among high
level public officials. Administrative corruption imposes a heavy burden on citizens’ and firms’ time
and resources. For example, Olken and Barron (2009) estimate that 13 per cent of the cost of a
truck driver’s trip in Indonesia is allocated to pay bribes to police officials that they encounter on
their journey. In Uganda, bribes represent 8 per cent of firms’ production costs (Svensson 2003).
Corruption creates discontent with public services, undermines trust in public institutions (Sacks
and Larizza 2012; Singer 2013) and stifles business growth and investment.
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Often, it is the poor and the vulnerable who suffer the most from public sector corruption
(Olken 2006; Sukhtankar 2011). A landmark study in Uganda found that only 13 per cent of the
public funds that the central government had assigned to the school system reached the intended
destination (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Reinikka and Svensson
2011). In India, the lack of monitoring and accountability has resulted in high levels of public sector
absenteeism, with one quarter of all the teachers in public schools and more than a third of nurses
and doctors being absent from their duties (Chaudhury et al. 2006).
Community monitoring interventions (CMIs) aim to address such issues and have become
common in recent years. Such programmes seek to involve communities in the monitoring of
public service providers to increase their accountability to users. However, their effectiveness in
reducing corruption and improving access and quality of services remains unclear. A number of
well-known studies of CMIs purport to demonstrate the effectiveness of CMIs.
Over the last decade, the World Bank alone has channelled USD 85 billion to local participatory
development (Mansuri and Rao 2012). The United Nations has set increasing citizen participation as
its main strategy to achieve good governance and human rights (UN 2008). Nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) with a focus on increasing government accountability through citizen parti-
cipation continue to expand around the globe, managing increasing amounts of resources.1
Reports from major donors acknowledge that the lack of systematic evidence limits our ability
to make precise claims regarding the relationship between CMIs, corruption and service delivery
outcomes (Brinkerhoff and Azfar 2006). There are a number of nonsystematic literature reviews on
community interventions or interventions for increasing citizen engagement in service delivery, for
example Devarajan, Khemani and Walton (2011), Gaventa and Barrett (2012), Mansuri and Rao
(2012), Pande and Olken (2011) and Ringold et al. (2012). This is the first systematic review of the
evidence on CMIs. We used systematic methods to search, appraise and synthesise evidence,
reaching lessons for policy transparently. Related systematic reviews have examined specific
interventions aimed at reducing corruption (Hanna et al. 2011) or improving social cohesion
(King, Samii, and Snilstveit 2010).
Thepaper is structured as follows. In Section 2,wepresent the interventionbackground and the theory
of change. Section 3 presents objectives and the review approach. Section 4 presents search results, study
descriptives and bias assessment. Section 5 gives results for primary and secondary outcomes. Finally,
Sections 6 and 7 provide a discussion and conclusions for policy, programmes and research.
2. Community monitoring interventions
The idea that community members have incentives to monitor providers and demand better
services (Stiglitz 2002) led practitioners to believe that allowing communities to have monitoring
power over providers could be beneficial for improving service delivery and reducing corruption in
both the short and long term. In the short term, it could improve outcomes by identifying pockets
of corruption and inefficiency in service delivery. In the long term, it may contribute to changes in
political norms and to establishing a transparent and accessible channel of communication for the
community to provide feedback to providers and politicians on a regular basis.
Over the last two decades, programmes aimed at encouraging community monitoring have
been introduced in Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Kenya, India,
Indonesia, Malawi, Philippines, South Africa and Uganda, among others (Reinikka and Svensson
2004; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Reinikka and Svensson 2011; Pan and Christiaensen 2012; Tosi
2012; Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira 2012; Capuno and Garcia 2010; Ringold et al. 2012).
CMIs, often referred to as social accountability mechanisms, are approaches where the commu-
nity is given the opportunity to participate in the process of monitoring service delivery, where
monitoring means being able to observe and assess providers’ performance and provide feedback
to providers and politicians. The Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Farmers in India
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was the first organisation to introduce a social accountability initiative, through social audits in the
early 1990s (Maru 2010).
The four major categories of such interventions are information campaigns, scorecards and citizen
report cards, social audits and grievance redress mechanisms (GRMs) (Table 1). These four categories
share two common elements: a clear objective of reducing corruption and improving service delivery and
using encouragement of the community to monitor service delivery as a key intervention instrument.
Information campaigns are one of the most common interventions to encourage participation
and interest in service delivery monitoring. They usually involve provision of information on the
benefits of the service to be delivered (health, education, police and so on) and the current state of
the service in the community. The information could be provided door to door, in public gather-
ings aided by local leaders, through radio, newspapers or other means (for example Keefer and
Khemani 2011). Information campaigns can also include information on how to monitor providers
(for example Banerjee et al. 2010).
Scorecards, often referred to as citizen report cards, encourage participation in monitoring
service delivery by giving citizens a voice to demand better services. An important difference
between information campaigns and scorecards is that the latter can include an interaction
between citizens and providers, while the former does not include a forum for such interaction.
For example, in Uganda, NGOs facilitated village and service provider staff meetings in which
community members discussed information on the status of health service delivery and were
encouraged to develop plans identifying steps providers should take to improve service delivery
(Björkman and Svensson 2009).
Social audits involve interactions not only between citizens and providers but also with
politicians, as for instance in Colombia’s Citizens Visible Audit programme which worked with
public infrastructure projects in water and sanitation infrastructure, schools and hospitals (Molina
2013b). A social audit involves dissemination of information through radio, newspapers and local
TV in the neighbourhoods where the project is due to take place; a public forum where citizens are
introduced to the project and told about their rights and entitlements, including the activities they
can do to monitor the project and the responsibilities of the executing firm; establishment and
training of a group of beneficiaries to carry out community monitoring activities; periodic public
meetings, bringing together local authorities, neighbours and representatives from the firm carry-
ing out the specific project, to discuss the state of the project and enable community members to
voice concerns and the firm and local government to make commitments to solve the problems;
regular monitoring of the project by the beneficiary group and collection of information on
whether commitments are being honoured; and presentation of the finalised project to the
community before making the final payment to the executing firm and sharing of the audit results
with all interested and concerned stakeholders.
Table 1. Interventions to increase civic participation in monitoring.
Intervention Description
Information campaign These are efforts to inform citizens about their rights to services, quality standards and
performance campaigns. In particular, it can include information on the importance of the
service, on providers’ performance and on how to monitor providers
Scorecards and citizen
report cards
These involve quantitative surveys that assess users’ satisfaction and experiences with various
dimensions of service delivery. It often involves a meeting between the recipients of services
and providers to discuss the findings of the survey and to develop a follow-up plan (Ringold
et al. 2012)
Social audit Social audits allow citizens receiving a specific service to examine and crosscheck the
information the provider makes available against information collected from users of the
service (Ringold et al. 2012)
Grievance redress
mechanisms
These are mechanisms that provide citizens with opportunities to use information redress to
influence service delivery and give feedback on government programmes and services,
mechanisms including complaint hotlines, informal dispute resolution mechanisms and
courts (Ringold et al. 2012)
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Social audits can also give citizens the power to make decisions about the project. An example
of a CMI where citizens had decision-making power is the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP)
in Indonesia, a community-driven development programme that funded projects in about 15,000
villages each year (Olken 2007). Funds were paid to village ‘implementation teams’ in three
instalments. To receive the second and third payments, the teams had to make accountability
reports at an open village meeting.
GRMs provide people with opportunities to use information to influence service delivery. GRMs
capture different mechanisms that provide citizens with opportunities to use information redress to
influence service delivery and give feedback on government programmes and services. Such
mechanisms include complaint hotlines, informal dispute resolution mechanisms and courts
(Ringold et al. 2012).
We developed a stylized causal chain (Figure 1), which presents the processes involved in a
typical CMI and the mechanisms through which the programme is expected to have an impact on
corruption and service delivery outcomes, where service delivery is defined as the process through
which basic services, such as education, health and security, are delivered to communities.2 The
causal chain suggests
Figure 1. Causal chain for community monitoring interventions.
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● CMIs will increase the quantity and the degree to which citizens are involved in monitoring
service providers.
● As a result of the CMIs, politicians and providers will exert more effort and improve their
performance in relation to service delivery.
● CMIs will reduce the probability of corruption.
● CMIs will improve access and quality of the service provided.
A typical CMI begins by attempting to make the project or service that it aims to monitor salient in
the community. This is usually done though a communication campaign (building block 1) using as
many mediums as possible, such as radio, newspapers, door-to-door campaigns and local TV. The
campaign’s primary objective is to increase citizen knowledge of (a) the performance of the service
to be monitored and/or (b) the importance of the service or project for the community.
Equipped with this information, citizens can engage in different activities. For instance, they
might change their private actions or contact fellow community members to collectively pressure
providers and politicians to improve the quality of the service through monitoring activities
(building block 2). To encourage citizens to monitor service providers, CMIs usually include
activities to build the capacity of beneficiaries to monitor providers.
Empowered with information, citizens are expected to solve the collective action problem and
invest their time and effort to participate in monitoring service delivery (building block 3). Participation
in monitoring activities could take many forms, depending on the specific CMI. For instance, social
audits have public forums and scorecards and can include meetings between providers and citizens.
As an organised group, citizens can take turns to visit the place where the service or project
takes place, such as a school, construction site or hospital, and collect information on its problems,
for example absenteeism, use of low-quality inputs in the construction process, and unresponsive
front-line providers. Citizens can then contact providers (building block 6) and/or elected officials
(building block 4) to file complains about the service and provide information on the specific
problems the service is facing. In addition, citizens are expected to share the information collected
by monitoring providers with their fellow neighbours who did not take part in monitoring activities
(building block 5), to increase visibility of the CMI and put pressure on providers and politicians.
Citizens’ participation in the programme may reduce the cost of monitoring front-line providers
for politicians and managers. Citizens’ monitoring activities also increase both visibility and citizens’
ability to recognise whether elected officials are making an effort to reduce corruption and
improve service delivery. As a result, there may be a greater incentive for politicians and policy-
makers to achieve better results and to put more pressure on providers to improve service delivery
(building block 7). The threat of formal sanctions by politicians and/or informal sanctions by
citizens is assumed to motivate service providers into exerting greater effort.
Many of these processes are mediated by local norms and context. Participation in the CMI will
be influenced by the strength of the community to act collectively. For example, communities with
a history of grassroots participation are expected to organise more rapidly and more efficiently
(Björkman and Svensson 2010). History can play an important role here. For example, in parts of
Africa, the history of slave trade left an imprint in cultural norms and beliefs which arguably
diminished the trust among fellow citizens and reduced the strength of the community to act
collectively (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). The independence and strength of the local media is
also assumed to impact upon the visibility of the project (Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Ringold
et al. 2012). Finally, this is a dynamic process, which makes understanding the specific history of
service delivery, citizen engagement and political accountability in the community where the
intervention took place crucial (Grandvoinnet, Aslam, and Raha 2015).
There are also some features that are specific to each intervention. Scorecards have an added
accountability mechanism through which citizens meet with service providers to discuss how to
improve the service. This face-to-face interaction introduces intrinsic motivation arguments for the
service providers, which may contribute to improving their performance. This will be moderated by
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whether it is credible for a given community to establish an informal system of rewards and
sanctions. Additionally, the meeting could result in new ideas for providers and citizens on how to
use and manage the service in a more efficient way.
Social audits contain an additional component in the form of public forums that allow citizens
to make their voice heard by local officials and providers, simultaneously reducing the time and
effort citizens would need to invest to get an appointment with officials, costs for central govern-
ment representatives to be heard by local officials and costs of local officials to take actions to solve
problems that arise during the implementation of the projects.
Several assumptions underlie the causal chain. Citizens need to participate in monitoring
activities and politicians and providers need to be accountable. For citizens to participate, they
need to have adequate information on how to monitor the project, be able to pay the opportunity
cost of participation and coordinate their actions to monitor the project. Finally, citizens should
believe that the programme has the potential to be successful, pay attention and be able to
understand the information provided. Providers and politicians need to gain popularity, increased
salary and/or social recognition, obtain re-election or avoid social disapproval or an indictment.
Whether or not these assumptions are met can affect citizens’ decision on whether to monitor
government activity and the governments’ willingness to facilitate citizen engagement and
become more accountable.
For example, one potential concern is that citizens will fail to participate in monitoring activities
(building block 3). In particular, if community monitoring activities are not carried out, or carried
out by only a few citizens, their ability to uncover problems and put pressure on the government
to provide accountability can be significantly reduced.
Another potential concern is that politicians and providers may not be accountable to their
citizens (building blocks 4 and 6). For example, if the community is not needed for a politician to
stay in power, the politician’s performance may not improve as a result of the CMI. In addition, in
communities where providers are not responsive to politicians, CMIs will only be effective if they
are able to change provider behaviour. Communities often have low state capacity, which limits
the ability of governments to monitor providers (Besley and Persson 2011). If this is the case,
putting pressure on the government is likely to be ineffective and only competition or informal
sanctions from the community may have an effect on providers’ performance.
Citizens need to participate in monitoring activities and politicians and providers need to be
accountable. For citizens to participate, they need to have adequate information on how to
monitor the project, be able to pay the opportunity cost of participation and coordinate their
actions to monitor the project. Finally, citizens pay attention to the information, be able to
understand the information provided and believe the programme has the potential to be success-
ful. Providers and politicians need to gain popularity, increased salary and/or social recognition,
obtain re-election or avoid social disapproval or an indictment. If these assumptions are not met,
the underlying programme theory of the CMI breaks down and this may prevent CMIs from having
an impact on service delivery outcomes. In particular, whether or not they hold true can affect
citizens’ decision on whether to monitor government activity and the governments’ willingness to
facilitate citizen engagement and become more accountable. Below, we present the bottlenecks as
well as the empirical implications.
2.1. Civic participation failure
One potential concern with CMIs is that citizens will fail to participate in monitoring activities
(building block 3). We have identified six potential bottlenecks3 that could prevent citizens from
participating in monitoring activities, which in turn reduces the potential impact of the programme
(see Table 2). In particular, if community monitoring activities are not carried out, or carried out by
only a few citizens, their ability to uncover problems and put pressure on the government to
provide accountability can be significantly reduced.
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2.2. Politicians and providers’ accountability
Under this heading, we present potential reasons for a lack of responsiveness on the part of the
politicians and providers (See Table 3). The literature cites many reasons why politicians and
providers may not be accountable to their citizens (building blocks 4 and 6). Below, we identify
three potential bottlenecks.
Table 2. Bottlenecks preventing citizens from participating in monitoring activities.
Bottleneck Description Empirical implications
Information gaps Scholars and policymakers have long argued that
programmes often fell short of their expectations
because of information problems (Ringold et al.
2012). In the case of the CMIs, there are two
important potential deficiencies: (a) the
information may not have been properly
disseminated (building block 1) and/or (b)
information on how to monitor the project was
either not provided or not understood by the
citizens (building block 2)
● If the information is not properly dissemi-
nated, citizens will not participate in mon-
itoring activities
● Citizens’ probability of participation in mon-
itoring activities will be a function of how
well they understand how to monitor
providers
Lack of attention
span or
rational
inattention
Even if information is provided, it may fail to have
the anticipated outcome. A factor that conditions
its success is what information is to be disclosed
(content), and how it is to be presented (vehicle).
In the case of CMIs, citizens’ lack of attention
span might prevent them from absorbing the
information provided by the intervention and
properly monitor providers. Citizen may also
choose not to pay attention often describe as
rational inattention. As a consequence,
introducing new information does not always
lead to new beliefs or changes in behaviour
If citizens’ opportunity cost of paying attention to
the information is high or they lack of attention
span, their probability of participation will
decrease4
High opportunity
cost of
participation
Citizens, and particularly the poor, simply may not
have the time to get informed or give feedback
on service delivery because of more pressing
priorities such as securing food and meeting
other basic needs (Banerjee and Mullainathan
2008)
If opportunity cost of participation is high,
probability of participation will be lower
Collective action
failure
Scholars have emphasised the collective action
problems that can arise in the presence of a
nonexcludable local public good (Olson 1971),
such as community monitoring. If community
members believe fellow citizens will contribute
to monitor the project, they may decide not to
participate
If citizens expect other citizens would free ride on
their efforts to monitor the project, the
probability and intensity of participation will be
lower
Citizens’ beliefs
can prevent
participation
Citizens may refuse to take advantage of the
opportunity to influence politicians and providers
if they believe the chances of success are low.
These beliefs can become a self-fulfilling
prophecy where citizens refuse to participate and
as a consequence, providers have fewer
incentives to improve performance (Molina
2013a)
Citizens who perceived politicians and/or
providers are responsive to them have higher
probability of participation in community
monitoring activities
Elite capture Community monitoring may also be prone to be
captured by local elites (Bardhan 2002; Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2006; Olken 2007). The rationale
is that when decision-making is part of the CMI,
the elite would want to take advantage by
capturing the monitoring process and
appropriate the resources associated with the
programme
If the CMI is captured by local elites, the
participation will be limited to its supporters,
which may affect the effectiveness of the
programme. It is an empirical question whether
the elite capture could improve or worsen
outcomes. See Atlas et al. (2012) for an example
of different types of elites
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3. Approach
We followed Campbell and Cochrane Collaboration guidelines for systematic reviews and meta-
analysis (Shadish and Myers 2004; Booth 2011; Higgins and Green 2011)and were also informed by
approaches developed by 3ie (White 2009; Snilstveit 2012; Waddington et al. 2012).
We aimed to answer two specific review questions6:
(1) What are the effects of CMIs that use encouragement of the community to monitor service
delivery, on service delivery and corruption in Lower and Middle Income Countries (L&MIC)s?
(2) What are the mechanisms through which CMIs effect a change in service delivery and
corruption outcomes?
We searched for eligible studies of CMIs in any L&MIC country defined according to the World Bank
definition at the time the intervention being studied was carried out. We searched for relevant
studies across a broad range of online databases, websites and knowledge repositories which
allowed the identification of both peer reviewed and grey literature. Keywords for searching were
translated into Spanish, French and Portuguese and relevant non-English language literature was
included. We also conducted reference snowballing and contacted experts and practitioners to
identify additional studies. We used Endnote software to manage citations, abstracts and docu-
ments. First, stage results were screened against the inclusion criteria by two independent
reviewers with additional supervision by a third.
Table 3. Bottlenecks causing a lack of responsiveness from politicians and service providers.
Bottleneck Description Empirical implications
Unresponsive
politicians
Even in well-functioning democracies, citizens in a
given community may not be pivotal for
politician’s electoral strategy (Downs, 1957;
Hotelling, 1929; Persson and Tabellini 2002). This
means that citizens’ support is not needed for
politicians to win elections and/or stay in power
Additionally, especially in developing countries, often
the political system does not work properly and
institutions do not help translate the preference of
the people into policy (Acemoglu and Robinson
2008). Keefer and Khemani (2004, 2005) argue that
public service providers have weak incentives to
improve performance quality because their jobs
are protected by political agents – politicians have
stronger incentives to provide secure public sector
jobs as teachers, health workers and local
bureaucrats, than to pressure these job holders to
improve service delivery
If the community is not needed for the politicians to
stay in power, we should find that politicians’
performance does not increase as a result of the
CMI, irrespective of what happens with citizen
engagement in monitoring activities
Unresponsive
providers
The literature on providers’ motivations to deliver
services no longer assumed them to be either
public-spirited altruists (knights) or passive
recipients of state largesse (pawns). Instead, they
are often considered to be in one way or another
self-interested (knaves) (Le Grand, 2003).
Communities in developing countries often have
low state capacity, which limits the ability of
governments to monitor self-interested providers
(Besley and Persson 2011). If this is the case,
putting pressure on the government will be
ineffective and only competition or informal
sanctions from the community may have an effect
on providers’ performance
In communities where providers are not responsive
to politicians, CMIs will only be effective if it
changes providers’ behaviour
If communities can impose a credible threat of
informal social sanctions to unresponsive
providers, the probability of a change in
behaviour from providers will be higher,
regardless of whether they are responsive to
politicians
If communities can choose providers, competition
among them will foster better performance5
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
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Included CMIs needed to have a clear objective of reducing corruption and/or improving service
delivery, use encouragement of the community to monitor service delivery as a key intervention
instrument and fall into one of the four intervention categories defined above. Eligible comparisons
could be passive, such as no formal process of monitoring (for example Björkman and Svensson
2009), or active, for example CMI with no encouragement to participate (for example Olken 2007).
We included quantitative studies with either experimental or quasi-experimental design to
address review question 1. In addition, both quantitative and qualitative studies were eligible for
inclusion to address review question 2, provided the evidence was taken from a study eligible for
inclusion for question 1 or a ‘sibling study’ (that is a study on the same intervention as those
included for question 1).
Corruption and service delivery were the primary outcomes of the review. We defined corrup-
tion as dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power. A big issue in the literature is the
difficulty in measuring corruption accurately (Pande and Olken 2011). As a consequence, we
included corruption estimates from both the forensic economic literature (Zitzewitz 2012) as well
as measures based on perceptions of corruption. We also defined service delivery outcomes as
access to and quality of the service. For example, if the goal of the CMI was to facilitate household
access to clean water, the percentage of access to clean water and water quality would be the
outcome of interest. If the goal was to monitor school performance, children’s tests scores would
be the desired outcome. We also collected data on intermediate outcomes measuring changes in
behaviour, such as whether participants contribute to monitoring of the service or project and the
behaviour and performance of providers and politicians.
Two reviewers independently coded and extracted data on study details, design and relevant
results from the included studies.7 Studies were critically appraised for potential bias across using a
tool provided by 3ie (available in Waddington et al. 2014). ‘Low risk of bias’ studies were those in
which clear measurement of and control for confounding was made, where intervention and
comparison groups were described adequately and risks of spillovers or contamination were
small, and where reporting biases and other sources of bias were unlikely. ‘Medium risk of bias’
studies had suspected threats to validity of the attribution methodology, or possible risks of
spillovers or contamination, arising from inadequate description of intervention or comparison
groups or suspected reporting biases. We did not classify any included studies as being of ‘high risk
of bias’.
We used a combination of statistical meta-analysis and narrative synthesis along the causal
chain to pool the evidence. To prepare the data for meta-analysis, we calculated standardised
mean differences (SMDs) and average standardised effects8 and 95 per cent confidence intervals
(95% CIs) for continuous outcome variables, and risk ratios and risk differences and 95 per cent CIs
for dichotomous outcome variables. All effect sizes were computed as continuous outcomes,
excepting those from Pandey et al. (2007), which were computed as dichotomous outcomes.
We then synthesised results using statistical meta-analysis. Where possible, we extracted data
on intermediate outcomes such as citizen participation and public officials and service providers’
responsiveness.
Table 4. Forensic economic estimates of corruption.
Study Variable definition CMI type Effect size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval ES type
Olken (2007) – invitations Per cent missing fundsa Social audit 0.08 −0.10 0.26 SMD
Olken (2007) – invitations + comment Per cent missing fundsa Social audit 0.08 −0.10 0.25 SMD
Olken (2007) – all interventions 0.08 −0.08 0.24 SMD
Reinikka and Svensson (2011) Share of funding reaching school IC 0.22 0.05 0.40 SMD
Meta-analysis 0.15 0.01 0.29 SMD
aCalculated as log-reported value – log actual value (major items in roads and ancillary projects).
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; SMD: standardised mean differences.
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Where studies reported the effect of more than one intervention, we chose the interventions
that could be classified as one of our four categories. In cases where more than one intervention
was relevant, we pooled their effects before integrating them into meta-analysis, taking into
account the correlation of the treatment and control groups between study arms to address
possible dependency.9 This is the case of Afridi and Iversen (2013), Banerjee et al. (2010), Barr
et al. (2012), Olken (2007) and Pradhan et al. (2014). Where we identified different measures for the
same outcome, we followed a similar procedure. We computed a synthetic effect size, defined as
the mean effect size in that study, with a variance that takes account of the correlation among the
different outcomes (Borenstein et al. 2009). Finally, when we found different follow-up periods for
comparable interventions, we compared them considering similar horizon time. This is the case for
Björkman and Svensson (2009) and Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013), who report both
the short and the medium-term impacts of an intervention in Uganda, and the short-term impact
of another intervention in the same place. In these cases, we only run meta-analysis for short-term
effects.
Further details about the methods used to undertake the review are provided in the published
protocol and the full technical report (Molina et al. 2016).
4. Included study characteristics
The search process (Figure 2) returned 109,017 references, of which 36,955 were eliminated as
duplicates and a further 71,283 were excluded at the title screening stage. The remaining 787
papers were included for abstract screening and 181 studies were included for full-text screening.
Figure 2. Search and selection process.
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Fifteen studies met the inclusion criteria for addressing review question 1 and six ‘sibling studies’
were also included to address question 2.
Descriptive information on included studies is provided in Appendix table. Studies evaluated the
effects of 23 different CMIs in the areas of information campaigns (10), scorecards (3), social audits
(5) and combined information campaigns and scorecards (2). Included studies were conducted in
Africa (6), Asia (7) and Latin America (2). Uganda and India had the largest presence of CMI impact
evaluations, with four studies conducted in each country. We also identified two studies from
Indonesia and one each from Benin, Liberia, Colombia, Pakistan and Mexico. Most studies focused
on interventions in the education sector (9), followed by health (3), infrastructure (2) and employ-
ment promotion (1).
Studies assessed the effects of CMIs on all primary outcomes. Eleven studies reported on
improvement in prevalence condition, seven on access to service, three on perception of corrup-
tion, two on average waiting time to get the service and two on forensic economic estimates for
corruption. Different outcome measures were used by sector. For example, in health, access was
measured as utilisation, coverage or immunisation. Ten studies used randomised assignment and
five used quasi-experimental methodologies such as instrumental variables and matching (Keefer
and Khemani 2011; Molina 2013b).
Seven studies were categorised as of low risk of bias in attributing outcomes to the intervention,
based on our five criteria of selection bias and confounding, spillovers, outcome reporting bias,
analysis reporting bias and other sources of bias (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2015; Banerjee et al.
2010; Barr et al. 2012; Björkman and Svensson 2009; Olken 2007; Pandey et al. 2007; and Pradhan
et al. 2014). The remaining eight studies were classified as of medium risk (Afridi and Iversen 2013;
Björkman, De Walque, and Svensson 2013; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2008; Keefer and
Khemani 2011; Molina 2013b; Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2009; Pandey, Goyal, and
Sundararaman 2009; Piper and Korda 2010, and Reinikka & Svensson, 2011). Thus, the overall risk
of bias assessment is predominantly low, with 13 out of 15 papers having this level of risk, followed
by 2 papers with medium risk of bias (Figure 3).
The majority of studies (11 out of 15) were adequately protected against performance bias as
the units of treatment were located far from the control units. While in some cases, the comparison
group was selected from villages where the intervention was not carried out but was located near
villages that had received the intervention,10 and in other cases, the comparison group received a
different treatment or the same intervention with a different degree of intensity (for example Afridi
and Iversen 2013; Olken 2007), the authors took that into consideration while designing the
intervention and selecting cluster for their standard errors. We found just one case of potential
outcome reporting bias, where the outcome reported was a new type of literacy test and the
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
5) Other sources of bias adressed?
4) Analysis reporting bias addressed?
3) Outcome reporting bias addressed?
2) Spillovers adressed?
1) Selection bias and confounding adressed?
Overall risk of bias assessment
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
Figure 3. Summary of critical appraisal of studies of effects.
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authors had not clearly justified the reason for using the measure over standard ones (Keefer and
Khemani 2011). With regards to analysis reporting bias, in most of the included studies, different
measures for the same outcome are reported or different specification and estimation methods are
applied. There was no evidence that outcomes or specifications methods were selectively reported
and the authors used ‘common’ methods of estimation.
We also assessed publication bias in the body of evidence, using tests for small study effects. We
pooled all SMD effect sizes (reversing the sign when needed, so all measured positive effects in the
same direction) and present the results in Figure 4. The asymmetry in the plot, together with the
result of the Egger et al. (1997) test (p-value = 0.058), suggests possible evidence of underreporting
of small sample studies, which is often considered as evidence of publication bias. However, the
low power of the tests prevents us from drawing strong conclusions.
5. Impacts of CMIs (review question 1)
In this section, we present the results of synthesis of effects to assess whether the included
interventions reduced corruption and improved service delivery outcomes (review question 1).
The included studies use a range of different measures to assess primary outcomes and it would
not be sensible to pool conceptually different outcomes in our meta-analysis. To avoid this
problem, we grouped studies only when the outcome variables represent a similar broad
outcome construct and the intervention is implemented in the same sector. In the case of
service delivery, we differentiated access from quality and performed separate analysis by sector
and outcome.
5.1. Corruption outcomes
We identified few studies assessing the effect of CMIs on corruption outcomes, using either
forensic estimates (two studies, two interventions) or perception measures (three studies, four
interventions). This limits our ability to generalise these results.
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
S
E
(E
S
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ES
Figure 4. Funnel plot showing pseudo 95 per cent confidence limits.
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Included studies on the effects of CMI on corruption outcomes were implemented in infra-
structure, education and employment assistance programmes. Two studies used forensic economic
estimates to collect outcomes data, and three studies (comprising four interventions) measured
perception of corruption.
We looked for different measures of corruption in the papers considered, with the aim of
extracting measures based on the application of economics to the detection and quantification
of behaviour (Zitzewitz 2012), in this case, corruption. With this purpose, we extracted all measures
that we could identify for each intervention. Table 2 lists the measures reported in each case.11 We
identified two studies reporting forensic measures of corruption (Olken 2007 and Reinikka and
Svensson, 2011). Olken (2007) evaluates the impact of increasing citizen participation in social
audits in Indonesia on corruption, with two different treatment arms testing different variations of
social audits. Villagers were invited to participate in social audits (‘accountability meetings’) in both
treatment arms, but in one group, the invitation was accompanied by an anonymous comment
form, which could be submitted in a sealed box. The results of this exercise were summarised in
the accountability meetings.12 The study reports a forensic measure of corruption which is the
percentage of missing funds in roads and ancillary projects. The effect of social audits only was
SMD 0.08 (95% CI [−0.10, 0.26]) while the effect of social audits with anonymous comment form
was also 0.08 (95% CI [−0.10, 0.25]). The combined effect for both treatment arms was SMD 0.08
(95% CI [−0.08–0.24]).13
Reinikka and Svensson (2011) evaluate the effect of systematic publication of monthly financial
transfers to schools in Uganda. They found that a school close to a newspaper outlet suffers less
from the capture of funds as compared to a school away from a newspaper outlet (Reinikka and
Svensson, 2011).14 The SMD shows that schools where the intervention took place had 22 per cent
less corruption than the others.
Meta-analysis suggests that overall effect of these interventions is positive, improving corrup-
tion outcomes by 0.15 SD, as it shown in Table 4 and Figure 5. Since Olken (2007) finds no
statistically significant effects, this result is probably driven by Reinikka and Svensson (2011), who
did find a positive and statistically significant effect.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 28.5%, p = 0.237)
ID
Olken (2007) - All interventions
Reinikka and Svensson (2011)
Study
0.15 (0.01, 0.29)
SMD (95% CI)
0.08 (-0.08, 0.24)
0.22 (0.05, 0.40)
-.1 0 .25 .5
Figure 5. Corruption – forensic economic estimates.
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It is difficult to detect and measure corruption objectively and because of that, we included
more subjective perception measures. Table 5 lists the outcome measures reported in the three
studies (four interventions) that we have included in this category. We were able to compute RD
for the first two studies and SMD for the third one, so we analyse them by separate.
We identified two studies assessing the effect of CMI on corruption perception measures for
which comparable effect size were available. Molina (2013b) found evidence that a social audit
improved the perception of the administration of resources in Colombia, while Pandey et al. (2007)
suggest that an information campaign carried out in India increased the probability of households
reporting that development work took place in the villages, which can be interpreted as a
reduction in corruption. The overall effect is RD 0.08 (95% CI [0.02, 0.13]), as can be seen from
the forest plot presented in Figure 6. The CIs are overlapping and the test of homogeneity does not
suggest between study variability. Both studies report a reduction in the perception of corruption
among beneficiary households.
Table 5. Perception measures of corruption.
Study Variable definition CMI type Effect size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval ES type
Molina (2013b) Adequacy in the
administration of resources
Social audit 0.03 −0.08 0.15 RD
Pandey et al. (2007) Percentage of household
reporting that development
work has been performed
in the village
IC 0.09 0.03 0.15 RD
Meta-analysis 0.08 0.02 0.13 RD
Afridi and Iversen (2013) – second audit Total number of irregularitiesa Social audit −0.22 −0.39 −0.05 SMD
Afridi and Iversen (2013) – third audit Total number of irregularitiesa Social audit −0.23 −0.43 −0.04 SMD
Afridi and Iversen (2013) – All interventions −0.23 −0.38 −0.07 SMD
aReversed sign for this variable.
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; SMD: standardised mean differences.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.364)
Molina (2013b)
ID
Pandey et al. (2007)
Study
0.08 (0.02, 0.13)
0.03 (-0.08, 0.15)
RD (95% CI)
0.09 (0.03, 0.15)
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Figure 6. Corruption – perception measures.
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Afridi and Iversen (2013) assess the effect of social audits in India. They estimate the effect on
reported irregularities in Gram Panchayats with one audit as compared to those with two and three
audits, respectively. The effect after two audits was to reduce irregularities by 0.22 SD (95% CI
[−0.39, −0.05]) and after three audits by 0.23 SD (95% CI [−0.43, −0.04]), suggesting increased
corruption in Gram Panchayats after these interventions, and a worsening effect with two or more
social audits, as compared to those with one audit only. The authors explain that this is likely due
to increasing complaints over time as participants become more aware of their entitlements, or
have greater confidence in the integrity of the audit process, or if the quality of the social audit
improves to increase the number of irregularities identified (Afridi and Iversen 2013).
5.2. Access to services
A number of different outcome measures were included as proxies for access to services. In this
section, we begin with health services and present the results for utilisation, immunisation and
other measures of access, followed by results for enrolment and dropout rates in the education
sector.
5.2.1 Health
We identified two studies that assessed at the impact of CMIs on utilisation. Björkman and
Svensson (2009) evaluate the same intervention, a combination of a scorecard with an information
campaign both in the short and in the medium term,15 using the same group of 50 facilities/
communities that were randomly assigned to treatment and control group.
In addition Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013) assess a new intervention, an information
campaign with new treatment and control groups in which 25 new facilities were randomly
assigned to a treatment group (13 units) and control group (12 units). This intervention differs
from the previous one since it does not include a scorecard with relevant information about the
health service provision.
In these studies, authors report an ‘average standardised treatment effect’ following Kling et al.
(2004)’s methodology that can be combined into one meta-analysis given their homogeneity and
given that they are comparable as they all imply better access to health services. Table 6 presents
the effect size for each intervention regarding utilisation of health services.16
Looking at the short run, both interventions show an increase in the access to health services,
although for the second one, the result is statistically no significant. This suggests that effects are
stronger when the information campaign is coupled with a scorecard, which is consistent with the
authors’ findings, who hint that without information, the process of stimulating participation and
engagement had little impact on health workers’ performance or the quality of health care
Table 6. Utilisation.
Study Variable definition CMI type Effect size 95 Per cent confidence interval ES type
Björkman and Svensson
(2009) – short term
Utilisation/Coveragea Scorecard + IC 2.13 0.79 3.47 ASE
Björkman, De Walque
and Svensson (2013) –
short term
Utilisation/Coveragea IC 0.04 −0.41 0.49 ASE
Meta-analysis 0.99 −1.05 3.02 ASE
Björkman and Svensson
(2009) – medium term
Utilisation/Coveragea Scorecard + IC 0.34 0.12 0.55 ASE
aWeighted mean of average number of patients visiting the facility per month for out-patient care, average number of
deliveries at the facility per month, share of visits to the project facility of all health visits averaged over catchment area and
share of visits to traditional healers averaged over catchment area.
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; ASE: average standardised effect.
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(Björkman, de Walque, and Svensson 2013). The overall effect is positive but not statistically
significant, and there is a large amount of between study variability (I2 = 88.0%, p = 0.004).
Looking at the medium term, the information campaign combined with the scorecard has a
positive and statistically significant effect on service access. Regarding immunisation outcomes,
Table 7 reports the short-run effects found by Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013) and
Pandey et al. (2007). It also reports the medium-term effects for the intervention assessed in
Björkman and Svensson (2009) which is not incorporated into meta-analysis given the different
time horizons.
Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013) assess the impact of the CMI on immunisation for
different age groups, while Pandey et al. (2007) compute the percentage of households where
infants have received vaccinations. The overall effect is an increase in risk ratio of 1.56 (95% CI [1.39,
1.73]), implying that the effect of the CMI improved access to services by 56 per cent (Figure 7). The
medium-term impact of the intervention reported by Björkman and Svensson (2009) is 1.04 SD but
statistically nonsignificant.17
Table 7. Immunisation.
Study Variable definition
CMI
type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Björkman, De Walque and Svensson (2013) Immunisationa IC 1.00 −0.63 2.63 RR
Pandey et al. (2007) Vaccinations received by
infants
IC 1.57 1.40 1.75 RR
Meta-analysis 1.56 1.39 1.73 RR
Björkman and Svensson (2009) – medium
term
Immunisationa IC 1.04 −0.52 2.61 RR
aMean of newborns, children less than 1 year, 1-year olds, 2-year olds, 3-year olds and 4-year olds, whether the child has
received at least one dose of measles, DPT, BCG and polio.
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.497)
and Svensson (2013)
Study
Pandey et al. (2007)
Björkman, de Walque
ID
1.56 (1.39, 1.73)
1.57 (1.40, 1.75)
1.00 (-0.63, 2.63)
RR (95% CI)
1-1 -.5 0 .5 2 3
Figure 7. Immunisation.
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Pandey et al. (2007) also report on different measures of access to health services, specifically
the percentage of households getting health services such as visits by nurse midwives, prenatal
examinations, tetanus vaccinations and prenatal supplements received by pregnant women. We
computed risk ratios for these outcomes, and the results are reported in Table 8. All risk ratios are
above unity, with an overall effect of 1.43 (95% CI [1.29, 1.58]) implying that the intervention
improved access to services in 43 per cent.
5.2.2. Education
We identified four studies evaluating effects on enrolment in six different treatment arms. Table 9
presents the effect sizes from all treatment arms. Before combining the studies into a meta-
analysis, we created synthetic effect sizes for the study with multiple treatment arms (Banerjee
et al. 2010) to avoid combining effects based on dependent samples. Figure 8 presents the forest
plot for the meta-analysis of enrolment rates. The overall average effect of CMI on enrolment is 0.09
SD (95% CI [−0.03, 0.21]). However, it can be noted that this result is driven by the inclusion of one
study for which the SMD is substantially higher than the others (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2015).
Also, there is significant between study heterogeneity (I2 = 73.6%, p = 0.010). Therefore, we
performed sensitivity meta-analysis excluding this study, which yielded an overall effect of 0.05
SD (95% CI [−0.03, 0.13]).
When considering only scorecards (Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2008), the overall effect
is zero (SMD = 0.003; 95% CI [−0.05, 0.05]). On the other hand, information campaigns show an
overall effect SMD 0.10, 95 per cent CI [0.01, 0.18], suggesting that these interventions have
increased enrolment rates in 10 per cent (Figure 9).
We identified four studies measuring dropouts at schools in seven treatment arms (Table 10).
For some interventions, the results suggest an increase in children out of school in the villages
receiving CMI compared to those who did not receive the programme. Considering the study of
Banerjee et al. (2010), the effects range from 0.02 SD improvement (95% CI [−0.01, 0.06]) for the
Table 8. Other access to service outcomes.
Study Variable definition CMI type Effect size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval ES type
Pandey et al. (2007) Visits by nurse midwife IC 1.03 0.94 1.14 RR
Prenatal examinations 1.63 1.45 1.83 RR
Tetanus vaccinations 1.57 1.39 1.77 RR
Prenatal supplements received by pregnant women 1.45 1.29 1.64 RR
Vaccinations received by infants 1.57 1.40 1.75 RR
Meta-analysis 1.43 1.29 1.58 RR
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
Table 9. Enrolment.
Study
Variable
definition CMI type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2015) Enrolment Scorecard 0.58 0.17 0.99 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation Enrolment IC 0.059 −0.138 0.257 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation + information Enrolment IC 0.05 −0.14 0.25 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – Mobilisation + information
+ ‘Read India’
Enrolment IC −0.008 −0.199 0.183 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – all interventions 0.04 −0.13 0.20 SMD
Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2008) Enrolment Scorecard 0.003 −0.048 0.054 SMD
Reinikka and Svensson (2011) Enrolment IC 0.12 0.02 0.22 SMD
Meta-analysis 0.09 −0.03 0.21 SMD
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; SMD: standardised mean difference.
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NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 73.6%, p = 0.010)
ID
and Khwaja (2013)
Andrabi, Das
Svensson (2011)
Banerjee et al. (2010)
Reinikka and
- All interventions
Gertler et al. (2008)
Study
0.09 (-0.03, 0.21)
SMD (95% CI)
0.58 (0.17, 0.99)
0.04 (-0.13, 0.20)
0.12 (0.02, 0.22)
0.00 (-0.05, 0.05)
-.2 0 .25 .5 1
Figure 8. Enrolment.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
.
.
Overall  (I-squared = 54.2%, p = 0.113)
Scorecard
Gertler et al. (2008)
Banerjee et al. (2010) - All interventions
Study
Reinikka and Svensson (2011)
ID
Subtotal  (I-squared = .%, p = .)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.373)
Information campaign
0.05 (-0.03, 0.13)
0.00 (-0.05, 0.05)
0.04 (-0.13, 0.20)
0.12 (0.02, 0.22)
0.00 (-0.05, 0.05)
SMD (95% CI)
0.10 (0.01, 0.18)
-.3 -.2 0 .1 .2 .3
Figure 9. Enrolment – sensitivity analysis (outlier excluded).
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treatment arm with mobilisation and information to 0.05 SD (95% [0.011, 0.081]) for the treatment
arm with mobilisation and information in addition to ‘Read India’ – reading camps held by trained
volunteers – with a combined effect of 0.03 SD (95% CI [0.003, 0.06]). The authors argue that this
result is due to ‘children dropping out of private or NGO schools (results omitted to save space). It
may be that parents consider the reading classes to be an adequate alternative to a private school’.
The CMI also resulted in an increase in dropout rates in the cases of Andrabi, Das and Khwaja
(2015) and for the training intervention in Pradhan et al. (2014). On the other hand, the linkage
intervention in Pradhan et al. (2014) and the study of Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2008) find
a reduction in dropout rates after interventions.
Before performing the meta-analysis (Figure 10), we calculated a synthetic effect size for the two
treatment arms included in the study of Pradhan et al. (2014) from Indonesia to avoid issues with
dependent effect sizes in the meta-analysis. We did the same with the three interventions reported
by Banerjee et al. (2010). Taking into account all the interventions, the overall effect is zero
(SMD = 0.00; 95% CI [−0.10, 0.10]).
5.3. Quality of services
In this section, we present the analysis of effects on quality of services by sector and outcome,
starting with health and followed by education.
5.3.1. Health
For health-related outcomes, we consider measures of child death and anthropometric outcomes.
We identified two studies with measurements of child mortality, Björkman and Svensson (2009)
and Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013). Table 11 shows that the short-term evaluation for
the two interventions had an overall effect of RR 0.76 (95% CI [0.42, 1.11]), suggesting that child
death had been reduced by 24 per cent after CMIs; however, the effect is not statistically
significant. Similar conclusions apply for the medium-term effect of the information campaign
combined with a scorecard where the effect is a reduction in 21 per cent in mortality.
We can also interpret an improvement in anthropometric measures as an improvement in the
quality of health services provided. Table 12 reports the impact of the same two CMIs on weight-
for-age scores.
In the short term, CMIs have increased weight for age scores by 20 per cent, suggesting that
quality of health services has improved. The positive impact seems to be stronger in the medium
term, resulting in a 29 per cent improvement. Homogeneity test suggests no variability between
studies (I2 = 0.01%, p = 0.928).
Table 10. Dropouts.
Study
Variable
definition
CMI
type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2015) Dropout rate IC 0.220 −0.159 0.600 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation Dropout rate IC 0.028 −0.006 0.063 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation + information Dropout rate IC 0.02 −0.01 0.06 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation + information
+ ‘Read India’
Dropout rate IC 0.046 0.011 0.081 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – all interventions 0.032 0.003 0.061 SMD
Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2008) Dropout rate IC −0.09 −0.14 −0.04 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – training Dropout rate IC 0.12 −0.08 0.31 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – linkage Dropout rate IC −0.03 −0.23 0.16 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – all interventions 0.041 −0.124 0.207 SMD
Meta-analysis 0.00 −0.10 0.10 SMD
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; SMD: standardised mean difference.
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In addition to these measures of health services’ quality, these studies also report on another
measure, namely average waiting time in medical facilities. The effects range from RR 0.91 (95% CI
[0.81, 1.01]) to RR 1.10 (95% CI [0.81, 1.15]) and are displayed in Table 13.18 Meta-analysis for the
Table 11. Child death.
Study Variable definition CMI type Effect size
95 Per cent confidence
interval ES type
Björkman and Svensson
(2009) – short term
Death (under five
mortality rate)
Scorecard + IC 0.65 0.42 1.02 RR
Björkman, de Walque and
Svensson (2013) – short
term
Death (infant mortality
rate)
IC 1.05 0.61 1.81 RR
Meta-analysis 0.76 0.42 1.11 RR
Björkman and Svensson
(2009) – medium term
Death (under five
mortality rate)
Scorecard + IC 0.79 0.57 1.08 RR
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
Table 12. Weight for age.
Study Variable definition CMI type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Björkman and Svensson (2009) – short term Weight for age (children
0–18 months)
Scorecard + IC 1.20 1.00 1.43 RR
Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013) –
short term
Weight for age (children
0–11 months)
IC 1.22 0.92 1.60 RR
Meta-analysis 1.20 1.02 1.38 RR
Björkman and Svensson (2009) – medium
term
Weight for age (children
0–18 months)
Scorecard + IC 1.29 1.01 1.64 RR
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 83.1%, p = 0.000)
- All interventions
- All interventions
Gertler et al. (2008)
Pradhan et al. (2014)
Andrabi, Das
and Khwaja (2013)
Banerjee et al. (2010)
Study
ID
-0.00 (-0.10, 0.10)
-0.09 (-0.14, -0.04)
0.04 (-0.12, 0.21)
0.22 (-0.16, 0.60)
0.03 (0.00, 0.06)
SMD (95% CI)
-.2 0 .25 .5 1
Figure 10. Dropouts.
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short-term interventions suggests a negligible effect (1 per cent reduction in waiting time).
However, there is a large between-study heterogeneity that might be driving these results
(I2 = 70.8%, p = 0.064).
5.3.2. Education
We included six studies assessing the effect of CMI on the quality of education as measured by test
scores.19 As can be seen from Table 14, three of these studies include multiple treatment arms. We
calculated synthetic effect sizes combining the different treatment arms before including these
studies in the meta-analysis. The overall average effect of CMI on student outcomes across these six
studies is an increase of 0.16 SD (95% CI [0.04, 0.29]).20
The assessment of homogeneity suggests a large amount of variability between studies. This is
further supported by the forest plot in Figure 11. The effect sizes range from SMD −0.01 (95% CI
[−0.03, 0.01]) in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011) to SMD 0.63 (95% CI [0.54, 0.71]) in Liberia
(Piper and Korda 2010). The CIs of these two studies do not overlap.
When we exclude the outliers (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2015; Piper and Korda 2010), the
overall effect is SMD 0.01 (95% CI [−0.01, 0.03]).
We conducted sensitivity analysis by CMI type, excluding the possible outliers (Figure 12). The
overall effect for information campaigns is zero (SMD = 0.004; 95% CI [−0.017, 0.024]).
Table 13. Average waiting time to get the service.
Study Variable definition CMI type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Björkman and Svensson (2009) – short term Waiting time in medical
servicesa
Scorecard + IC 0.91 0.81 1.01 RR
Björkman, de Walque and Svensson (2013)
– short term
Waiting time in medical
servicesa
IC 1.10 0.81 1.15 RR
Meta-analysis 0.99 0.80 1.17 RR
Björkman and Svensson (2009) – medium
term
Waiting time in medical
servicesa
Scorecard + IC 1.06 0.95 1.19 RR
aDifference between the time the user left the facility and the time the user arrived at the facility, subtracting the examination
time.
CMI: Community monitoring intervention.
Table 14. Test scores.
Study
Variable
definition CMI type
Effect
size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
ES
type
Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2015) Test score Scorecard 0.510 0.163 0.857 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation Test score IC 0.01 −0.02 0.04 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation + information Test score IC 0.010 −0.018 0.037 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – mobilisation + information
+ ‘Read India’
Test score IC 0.03 0.00 0.05 SMD
Banerjee et al. (2010) – all interventions 0.02 −0.01 0.04 SMD
Barr et al. (2012) – standard scorecard Test score Scorecard 0.03 −0.05 0.11 SMD
Barr et al. (2012) – participatory scorecard Test score Scorecard
(participatory)
0.078 −0.002 0.158 SMD
Barr et al. (2012) – all interventions 0.056 −0.015 0.127 SMD
Piper and Korda (2010) Test score IC 0.63 0.54 0.71 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – training Test score IC −0.02 −0.09 0.04 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – linkage Test score IC 0.07 0.02 0.13 SMD
Pradhan et al. (2014) – all interventions 0.03 −0.03 0.08 SMD
Reinikka and Svensson (2011) Test score IC −0.01 −0.03 0.01
Meta-analysis 0.16 0.04 0.29 SMD
CMI: Community monitoring intervention; SMD: standardised mean difference.
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6. Analysis of causal mechanisms (review question 2)
In this section, we synthesise evidence on the causal pathways through which CMIs may have an
effect on corruption and service delivery outcomes, drawing on data available in studies of effects
and the six ‘sibling studies’ we were able to identify (Table A1). Sometimes, causal pathways are
explicit and other times, finding pathways meant looking for implicit assumptions and arguments.
We revised the causal chain to show the assumptions we were able to identify from this causal
pathway analysis (Figure A1) and present findings here according to determinants of citizen
participation and politician and provider accountability.
6.1. Citizen participation
A potential concern with CMIs is that citizens may fail to participate in monitoring activities
(building block 3). We identified potential bottlenecks that could prevent citizens from participat-
ing in monitoring activities, which in turn reduces the potential impact of the programme. In
particular, if community monitoring activities are not carried out, or carried out by only a few
citizens, the likelihood they uncover problems and put pressure on the government to provide
accountability can be significantly reduced. We grouped evidence on citizens’ participation in
monitoring activities into five areas.
First, inadequate information on how to monitor the project does not seem to be an important
factor in explaining failures in participation in Colombia and India. The evidence also suggests that
even when information is poor, providing that information is not sufficient to increase participa-
tion. In India, Banerjee et al. (2007) found that parents, teachers and VEC (local equivalent to
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
Overall  (I-squared = 97.8%, p = 0.000)
ID
Piper and Korda (2010)
Svensson (2011)
Study
Reinikka and
and Khwaja (2013)
Barr et al. (2012)
Pradhan et al. (2014)
- All interventions
- All interventions
- All interventions
Andrabi, Das
Banerjee et al. (2010)
0.16 (0.04, 0.29)
SMD (95% CI)
0.63 (0.54, 0.71)
-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
0.06 (-0.02, 0.13)
0.03 (-0.03, 0.08)
0.51 (0.16, 0.86)
0.02 (-0.01, 0.04)
-.2 0 .25 .5 1
Figure 11. Test scores.
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parent–teacher association) members were not fully aware of how low students’ performance was
or the role of local committees, and how local participation might improve school performance.
Many parents were not aware of the existence of the VEC (sometimes even when they were
members of it), and VEC members were unaware of the key roles they were assigned in the
educational system. The authors therefore examined different information interventions to mobi-
lise parents to monitor schools, finding that providing information was not effective in encouraging
participation. However, encouraging communities to provide volunteers who were subsequently
trained by Pratham staff on techniques to teach children how to read and then running after-class
reading classes for them did improve reading levels by 3–8 per cent in treatment villages.
Molina (2013b) also found that in some communities, citizens were not aware of the existence
of the project they were supposed to monitor, and in some others, although they knew about the
project, they lacked information on how to monitor it. This prevented citizens in those commu-
nities from taking an active role in social audit community forums and community monitoring
activities in general. However, this was not the only or even the most important barrier to
participation in this study.
Second, evidence on whether high opportunity costs of participation could explain limited
engagement varied. Andrabi, Das and Khwaja (2015) find that better educated parents participate
more actively in monitoring activities in Pakistan, which might indicate that the opportunity cost of
participation is lower for them. In contrast, Molina (2013b), studying the ‘Auditorias Visibles’ social
audit project in Colombia, was not able to find differences between participants and nonpartici-
pants in employment status, income level or whether they work at home or not.
 
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
.
.
Overall  (I-squared = 44.8%, p = 0.142)
Subtotal  (I-squared = .%, p = .)
Scorecard
Subtotal  (I-squared = 36.5%, p = 0.207)
- All interventions
Reinikka and
- All interventions
Barr et al. (2012)
ID
Pradhan et al. (2014)
Banerjee et al. (2010)
Information campaign
Svensson (2011)
- All interventions
Study
0.01 (-0.01, 0.03)
0.06 (-0.02, 0.13)
0.00 (-0.02, 0.02)
-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
0.06 (-0.02, 0.13)
SMD (95% CI)
0.03 (-0.03, 0.08)
0.02 (-0.01, 0.04)
  -.1 0 .1 .2
Figure 12. Test scores – sensitivity analysis (outliers excluded).
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Third, pessimistic beliefs about politician and provider responsiveness were found in studies in
Colombia and India. Molina (2013b) found that perceiving oneself as influential to local govern-
ment is crucial for deciding whether to spend time in community monitoring activities. Banerjee
et al. (2010) suggest that citizens’ perceptions about providers’ responsiveness were important in
determining engagement with social accountability interventions in India, since only the interven-
tion that did not involve government action had significant effects on participation.21 Also in India,
Afridi and Iversen (2013) believed that cases of maladministration and corruption in MGNREGA
were underreported because of citizens’ pessimistic beliefs about the integrity of the audit process.
Singh and Vutukuru (2010), analysing the initial stages of the same intervention, also describe a
situation with little political enthusiasm during the pilot phase of the social audits, but with
subsequent high-level political support generating huge increases in the turnouts at the local
social audit meetings.
Evidence suggested that interactions between citizens and service providers could change
citizens’ perceptions of low accountability. Barr et al. (2012) used the voluntary contributions
mechanism game, a public goods game, played immediately after training of school management
committees, to show that willingness to contribute to public goods is significantly higher for those
in participatory treatment arms. However, the authors were not able to discriminate between two
potential mechanisms: that the participatory treatment affects preferences or beliefs about the
willingness of providers to contribute to public goods.
Woodhouse (2005) analysed the early stages of the KDP in Indonesia, finding that when villagers
possessed information about their rights and, crucially, when the potential perpetrators of corrup-
tion knew that villagers had this information, it raised the perceived cost of corrupt behaviour and
reduced the cost of fighting it. These pessimistic beliefs could also have been the cause of elite
capture (Olken 2007).
Finally, the effect of having beliefs that other citizens would not participate could not be verified.
Björkman and Svensson (2010) suggest that citizen participation may be threatened by differences
within the community, in particular because inequality and ethnic fractionalisation may be barriers
to collective action. However, the authors were unable to determine whether failures of collective
action were due to lack of trust among community members, lack of trust of the community in the
service providers and representatives or both.
6.2. Politician and provider accountability
Providers and politicians need to benefit (by gaining popularity, increasing or maintaining salaries
and/or social recognition) in return for being responsive to citizens. If these assumptions are not met,
the underlying programme theory of the social accountability information breaks down, in particular
by affecting citizens’ decisions on whether to monitor government activity. According to our causal
chain, even if participation is high, the CMI may be ineffective if politicians can ignore the demand for
accountability (for example the politicians does not need their support, clientelism, among others), or
even when politicians are committed to improve service delivery, providers are nonresponsive.
In this subsection, we are interested in understanding why demand was lacking. Is it because (a)
politicians would be unresponsive to demand, (b) providers would be unresponsive to increased
pressure from politicians or (c) citizens believe politicians/providers would be unresponsive. It is
important to note the difference between (a) and (b) with (c). While in (a) and (b), politicians and
providers respectively are not responsive, in alternative (c), they are responsive but citizens believe
they are not. As a result, they do not participate in monitoring and politicians and providers act as
if there is no demand.
Molina (2013b) suggests that when the community increases its demands by increasing citizen
participation in the social audit, the politicians respond by performing better, as evaluated by the
citizens, in this case in Colombia. Keefer and Khemani (2011) found that better learning outcomes
were not due to better providers’ performance, but due to changes in households’ behaviour, as
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citizens decided to circumvent the existing institutions to monitor service providers and instead
used private sector providers of education.
On the other hand, Björkman and Svensson (2009) found that scorecards were effective in
improving waiting times, staff attendance and attitudes towards participants, because of specific
innovations implemented to improve management as a result of the CMI. These included a
suggestion box for complaints and recommendations, numbered waiting cards for patients, a
poster informing about free health services and a poster on patients’ rights and obligations.
Hence, according to the authors, the programme was successful due to the behaviour change
among health facility staff.
Perhaps, more revealing is the evidence from studies with multiple treatments, with and with-
out facilitated (participatory) contact with providers. For example, Barr et al. (2012) found that only
the facilitated contact treatment was effective in reducing teacher absence, compared to the
standard treatment. Pradhan et al. (2014) also found evidence that facilitated contact between
users and providers may enhance motivation for citizens to care about service outcomes and for
providers to perform better, for some outcomes.
7. Discussion
Table 15 summarises the findings of the effects of CMIs. The results suggest positive effects on
reducing corruption, whether measured using forensic economic estimates or through participant
perception. In the case of health service delivery access, two interventions examined utilisation,
one finding a moderately large effect size in the medium term. For immunisation, we identified a
positive effect in the short term across two interventions, but not in the medium term.
Evidence suggests that CMIs by themselves do not improve access to services in education.
Across six interventions looking at education enrolment, results indicate CMIs increase enrolment
rates by a small but marginally statistically insignificant amount. Pooling across seven interventions
also does not suggest that CMIs reduce school dropouts. On the other hand, evidence from 10
studies suggests that CMIs significantly improve test scores. However, the 10 CMIs to improve test
scores are not exactly the same as the ones for increasing enrolment which prevents us from
inferring policy conclusion regarding which outcomes are better incentives through CMIs.
Table 15. Summary of effects of CMIs.
Primary outcome Variable definition
Number of
interventions Effect size
95 Per cent
confidence
interval
Forensic economic estimates of corruption 3 0.15 (SMD)a 0.01 0.29
Perception measures of corruption 2 0.08 (RD)a 0.02 0.13
2 −0.23 (SMD)a −0.38 −0.07
Access to service Utilisation (short term) 2 0.99 (ASE) −1.05 3.02
Utilisation (medium term) 1 0.34 (ASE)a 0.12 0.55
Immunisation (short term) 2 1.56 (RR)a 1.39 1.73
Immunisation (medium term) 1 1.04 (RR) 0.52 2.61
Enrolment 6 0.09 (SMD) −0.03 0.21
Dropout rate 7 −0.00 (SMD) −0.10 0.10
Improvement in prevalence
condition
Child death (short term) 2 0.76 (RR) 0.42 1.11
Child death (medium term) 1 0.79 (RR) 0.57 1.08
Weight for age (short term) 2 1.20 (RR)a 1.02 1.38
Weight for age (medium term) 1 1.29 (RR)a 1.01 1.64
Test score 10 0.16 (SMD)a 0.04 0.29
Quality of service Average waiting time to get the service
(short term)
2 0.99 (RR) 0.80 1.17
Average waiting time to get the service
(medium term)
1 1.06 (RR) 0.95 1.19
aStatistically significant at 95 per cent confidence level.
SMD: Standardised mean difference; ASE: average standardised effect.
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The evidence suggests that health conditions improved for child nutrition, as measured by
weight for age in two studies, but not child mortality (CMIs are estimated to reduce mortality rates
but the studies are underpowered to detect significant changes). The evidence also does not
support reductions in waiting time as a result of CMIs.
Few papers assess the effect of CMIs on any of these outcomes, so our ability to generalise the
summative findings of the review is limited.
The scant evidence found on mechanisms suggests that interventions that have modified
intermediate outcomes, such as citizen participation in monitoring activities and providers and
politicians’ performance, have been those that include a set of tools for citizens to monitor
providers or politicians and facilitate contacts between both parts. These interventions appear to
be the ones that have the bigger impacts on providers’ responsiveness (lower absence rates, more
teachers’ effort, better school inputs) and more participation of communities in monitoring
activities (more time spent in monitoring, more in-kind and monetary donations).
There are many reasons why interventions may fail to increase citizen participation in monitor-
ing activities, such as limited information or low expectations of leaders, officials or service provider
accountability or about the chances of success. In addition, there may be collective action failure,
where some citizens free ride on others’ efforts to monitor the project. Certain groups, especially
the poor, are less likely to participate in monitoring activities because they have more pressing
priorities.
From the evidence included in this review, we find that in the cases where citizens decided not
to monitor service provision, providers did not change their behaviour. However, for interventions
to increase politician and provider performance, hence, improving service delivery, providers and
politicians need to be accountable to citizens. Where enforcement mechanisms are lacking (for
example if citizen support is not needed for politicians to stay in power), it is likely that CMIs will
not improve outcomes along the causal chain. If, on the other hand, citizens can impose sanctions
on unresponsive providers, CMIs are more likely to improve providers’ performance.
Several studies emphasise the need to adapt interventions to local contexts including Björkman
and Svensson (2010), Mansuri and Rao (2012) and Devarajan, Khemani and Walton (2011).
8. Conclusions
This review identified and analysed available evidence regarding the effects of CMIs on both access
to and quality of service delivery and on corruption outcome measures in LMICs. The results
suggest that CMIs can have positive effects on corruption measures and some service delivery
measures. However, due to the small number of available studies, results should be interpreted
carefully. Interventions considered to address review question (1) may be not representative since
they took place mainly in Africa and Asia, in rural communities within specific contexts, so the same
interventions may have different effects elsewhere.
Further studies examining the effects of CMIs in different contexts are needed, especially
factorial studies that are able to distinguish between different mechanisms of effect.
Notes
1. There is also a new Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA), which is a coalition of donors,
governments and civil society organisations aiming to improve development results by supporting capacity
building for enhanced citizen feedback and participation to monitor service delivery. GPSA aims to reach
overall funding of 75–125 million USD over the next 7 years. To date, 15 countries have joined the GPSA:
Bangladesh, Belarus, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Moldova,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Philippines, Senegal, Tajikistan and Tunisia.
2. For the purpose of this review, service delivery involves not only services but also construction of necessary
infrastructure to carry out those services. As a result, we will talk indistinctly between service delivery and
project performance.
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3. The term bottlenecks has been used in the literature (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai 2013) to refer to constraints
that limit the effectiveness of community monitoring programmes.
4. In order to give salience to information practitioners use an array of instruments to attract the citizens’
attention. We are not aware of any CMIs where these incentives were embedded in the theory of change and
properly assessed. This appears to be a knowledge gap for CMIs.
5. In some parts of the world, the state fails completely to provide services and to monitor illegal private service
provision. Even under these environments, when citizens can choose providers overall providers’ performance
may increase.
6. We also aimed to answer a third review question – ‘to what extent do geographic region, income level or
length of exposure to interventions explains the variation in findings?’ – using moderator analysis. Due to the
limited number of studies, we were unable to perform planned moderator analyses by study design and
length of exposure to intervention. Moderator analysis by region did not reveal big differences.
7. We critically appraised the consistency among ratings by our coders through interrater assessment (McGraw
and Wong 1996). The absolute agreement intraclass correlation is 0.70 with a 95 per cent CI [0.21, 0.95]. In
case of disagreement, a third researcher determined the rating.
8. ASE (Kling et al. 2004) is interpreted in the same way as SMD. It is calculated by combining several measures
for the same outcome into a unique average standardised treatment effect (ASE), by estimating a seemingly
unrelated regression system for K-related outcomes: Y ¼ IK  T Xð Þ½  θþ υ
where IK is a K by K-identity matrix. The average standardised treatment effect is estimated
as ~β ¼ 1K
PK
k¼1
~βk
~σk
where ~βk is the point estimate on the treatment indicator in the kth outcome regression and ~σk is the standard
deviation of the control group for outcome k (Björkman, de Walque, and Svensson 2013).
9. In some cases, these correlations were available in the studies’ databases, or where easily obtainable from
tables reported in the papers. When not available, we assumed a value of 0.5 and checked whether the results
changed substantially for extreme correlation values.
10. All randomised field experiments report no statistical difference between treatment and control groups.
11. In both cases, we changed the sign of the effect size so it can be interpreted properly (that is a positive effect
size means that corruption has been reduced).
12. The study also evaluates the effect of external audits, which did reduced corruption, but we did not include it
in the meta-analysis because it does not fall into any of our four intervention categories.
13. This finding is consistent with those reported by the author, who argues that ‘increasing grassroots participa-
tion in monitoring had little average impact’ (Olken 2007).
14. Finally, we did not include Banerjee et al. (2010) as it is not a measure of corruption they use, but rather they
look at whether the treatments to increase community monitoring generated additional nonteaching
resources for the schools. They found that none of the interventions have any effect.
15. Actually, the medium-term impact of the first intervention is assed in Björkman, de Walque and Svensson
(2013). However, to avoid confusion, we designate the latter as the main reference for the second intervention
and Björkman and Svensson (2009) for the first intervention.
16. We were not able to compute neither SMD nor RR for these outcomes due to lack of information.
17. The short-term impact of this intervention is also not statistically significant, but it is not reported in the table
since we were not able to compute RR.
18. It is important to note why we think this is a quality measure and not an access measure. Access is related to
getting the service. However, you can get the service and the fact that you had to wait makes it less valuable
and of lesser quality.
19. When different test scores where reported (for example language and math test scores), we previously pooled
them following the procedure explained before.
20. It should be noted that we are excluding two studies for which we were not able to compute standardised
effects (Table 12) but which found significant effects of CMIs on our outcomes of interest. Keefer and Khemani
(2011) examine the proportion of children tested in the village public school who could read sentence and
paragraphs (ASER literacy test), finding that the information campaign resulting from communities’ access to
radios enhanced literacy tests. Pandey, Goyal and Sundararaman (2009) examined the percentage of children
who could pass different learning tests, including reading and writing competences and mathematics abilities.
21. Additional qualitative and quantitative evidence support this. For example, Gaventa and Barrett (2012)
perform a metacase study of 100 interventions aim to increase citizen engagement in service delivery. For
the 828 outcomes from the 100 reviewed case studies, only 153 came from interventions where the final goal
was to strengthen the responsiveness and accountability of the state to provide services. Results indicate that
55 per cent of those 153 outcomes were positive and 45 per cent were negative. Negative results were
associated with failure of citizens to participate, due in part to fear of backlash against those who speak out
and a sense of tokenism in the participation mechanism.
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Figure A1. Revised causal chain with assumptions identified from evidence.
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